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Abstract
The fiduciary relationship between portfolio managers and the
investors they represent may be viewed as a principal-agent relation-
ship, and therefore we have used the methodology from the agency
literature in economics and finance to study the impact of existing
compensation arrangements on the conflicts of interest between these
two groups. In this paper we employ the assumptions of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model and of estimation risk concerning beta to develop
a model in which portfolio managers can, through effort, choose the
parameters of the beta distribution. Our model entails moral hazard
because the investor cannot observe the manager's action. Given
certain utility functions we show that the presence of estimation risk.
leads the manager to choose a lower beta portfolio than otherwise and
that no first best optimal contract exists. We also show that the
direction of the managerial divergent behavior is related to the
divergence in risk preferences between the manager and the investor.
By making slightly more stringent assumptions about preferences, we
show that there exist some conditions under which the manager will
provide more effort but also a riskier portfolio than the investor
prefers. Finally we show that the investor will prefer a manager who
is less risk averse than the investor.

I. Introduction
The conflict of interest between investment advisors and their
clients concerns economists, policy makers, and investors, among others.
Of particular interest is the way in which compensation arrangements
between the two parties affect the conflict. The fiduciary relation-
ship between portfolio managers and the investors they represent may
be viewed as a principal-agent relationship, and therefore we have used
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the methodology from the agency literature in economics and finance to
study the impact of existing compensation arrangements on the conflicts
of interest between these two groups.
In the relationship between portfolio managers and shareholders, as
in all agency relationships, problems arise due to the absence of com-
plete information. The investor cannot costlessly observe all the
actions of the portfolio manager. In particular, the investor cannot
observe the returns distribution of the chosen portfolio. Since the
manager is motivated to choose a portfolio which is optimal in terms of
his or her own welfare, the investor wants to know whether such a choice
is optimal in terms of the investor's welfare. The problem is further
complicated if there is uncertainty associated with the parameters of
the distribution of the portfolio returns. If the manager can lower
this "estimation risk" through the provision of effort, there are two
potential sources of divergent behavior on the part of the manager:
the amount of effort and the portfolio characteristics.
The above problems could possibly be resolved if the investor were
able to observe portfolio outcomes over time, and as a consequence,
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infer the underlying stochastic process generating these outcomes. It
might then be possible for the investor to eliminate the costs of past
divergent behavior by requiring the manager to "settle up" ex post .
However, ex post settling up is not costless, since it would most likely
involve some kind of legal action. In addition, complete settling up
is not possible if the manager is bankrupt. Consequently, here, as in
all principal-agent relationships, the investor will prefer to avoid
such problems by setting up incentive compensation contracts. These
contracts are used to motivate the portfolio manager to take actions in
the investor's best interest.
We develop a model which describes the portfolio choices made by
the manager. We make several assumptions about both the returns distri-
bution and what the manager can do. The driving assumption of this
model is that the manager can choose the distribution of the parameters
of the returns distribution of the portfolio, and that the parameters'
distributions have non-zero variances. For given means of the parame-
ters' distributions, the manager, can through the provision of effort,
reduce the variance of these distributions.
We assume that expected returns follow the Capital Asset Pricing
Model. In the absence of "estimation risk," the portfolio manager would
choose the beta for the portfolio. When there is estimation risk, the
manager chooses the mean and the variance of the distribution of beta.
Expected utility for both the manager and the investor are then func-
tions of the mean and the variance of beta; we assume that these
functions are, additively separable in the mean and the variance, concave
3
in the mean, and decreasing in the variance. Under these conditions,
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we show a moral hazard problem will always exist. However, unlike many
other principal-agent models in which it is not possible to eliminate
the moral hazard problem, our model includes conditions under which the
agent actually provides more effort than the investor desires in
equilibrium, but chooses a variance which is not optimal from the
investor's perspective. Under these conditions we still have divergent
behavior, but of a different type.
In contrast, Starks [1987] showed that without uncertainty about
the parameters of the returns distribution of the portfolio, and with
no effort provided by the manager, an optimal linear sharing rule may
exist between the manager and the investor. However, if the manager is
able to use effort to increase the expected return of the portfolio,
that is, change the mean of the returns distribution without changing
the variance, a linear sharing rule will not be optimal. In that case
the portfolio manager will choose a level of effort that is less than
the investor wishes in equilibrium, but will choose the variance that
the investor wishes. That result depends crucially on the assumption
that the manager can choose the mean and the variance of the returns
distribution independently. In our model, the results depend crucially
on the assumption that the manager's choices of the mean and of the
variance of the portfolio are interdependent.
In the next section we formally present our assumptions and the
model. Section III contains the statement of our results (proofs are in
the Appendix). Conclusions are contained in Section IV.
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II. The Model
Consider a representative investor who turns over a sum of money,
K, to a representative portfolio manager for some period of time. After
the investor and manager agree on how the manager is to be compensated,
the manager selects a portfolio which earns some random return, R, over
the period. At the end of the period the portfolio is liquidated, the
4 5
manager is paid, and the residual goes to the investor. '
Also assume that asset returns are normally distributed and that
they are modelled according to the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), which implies that expected returns can be written
6
as:
(1) E(R.) = R + BJE(R ) - RJ
i I l m r
where
R the gross return on the investment portfolio i,
R = the gross return on the market portfolio,
m
R = the gross return on the riskfree asset, and
8. = the systematic relationship between R and R .
i i m
Since R is distributed normally,
(2) R
i
= E(R ) + a
±
z
where z ~ N(0,1).
Substituting from (1), equation (2) becomes
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(3) R. = Rf + b.[E(R ) - R. + or (z/r.)i t 1 m r m l
where
r. = the correlation coefficient between the returns of portfolio
i
i and the market portfolio.
If the investor invests the amount K in the portfolio, then the ending
dollar value of the portfolio is
(4) x. = R.K.
We further assume that the investor and the manager agree that the
portfolio is to be well diversified and that the appropriate benchmark.
Q
of performance is the market portfolio.
The driving assumption of our model is that the true value of 8.
cannot be measured with certainty by the manager. However, we also
assume that the manager can reduce this "estimation risk" by providing
more effort. For example, the manager may search for more information
about the securities in the portfolio and thereby reduce the estimation
risk. (See Barry and Brown [1984, 1985] for further discussion.)
Formally,
8 is a random variable with mean b and variance
»i
2
where a is a measure of the manager's effort
used in estimating the true 6.
•
Thus, we assume that as the mean risk level increases, the manager must
expend more effort in order to reduce the variance of the distribution
-6-
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of (3. • In addition, we assume that the market risk, of the portfolio,
z, is independent of the estimation risk.; that is, z and 8. are
independent random variables.
Since the investor cannot observe the true beta of the chosen port-
folio, nor the mean and variance of the distribution of beta, the
manager's compensation is a function only of what is jointly observable:
the ending value of the portfolio. Let S(x) denote the compensation
schedule.
Our main purpose in this paper is to describe the incentives created
by many existing compensation contracts, not to (necessarily) define an
"optimal" contract. Most existing contracts are linear functions of
the portfolio returns. For example, the most common contract in current
use pays the manager a percentage of the portfolio value. Another
popular contract is the symmetric performance contract, which can be
written as a linear function of both the portfolio and the market re-
turns. Consequently we restrict our attention to linear contracts.
The manager's utility is assumed to be a function of the effort
expended in reducing beta estimation risk as well as the manager's
wealth W , which itself is a function of the compensation schedule,
M
S(x ). Specifically, the manager's utility function is additively
separable in these variables, concave in the wealth variable and convex
decreasing in effort. Similarly, the investor is assumed to have a
utility function which is concave in wealth.
Given linear fee contracts, from equations (4) and (1) it can be
seen that both the manager's and investor's wealth can be written as
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linear functions of beta. Thus, for expositional purposes we can talk
about the individual's expected utility with respect to beta.
We also restrict our attention to certain types of utility of
wealth functions, specifically those whose expectations are concave in
2
the mean and decreasing in the variance of beta. Defining u and a as
the mean and variance of beta, respectively, we employ the following
, ,_ * , 12,13
expected utility of wealth function:
(5) E
fl
[U (8)J = F (u) - G (a
2
)
p • • •
for all p, a ; where
(i) there exists a value of u such that F =
(li) F <
«
(iii) g' >
(iv) g" >
(v) G (0) = 0.
Equation (5) incorporates both a utility function and a fee contract.
It is the result of having taken expectations with respect to both
sources of uncertainty: market risk and estimation risk.
With our previous assumption of linear contracts, there are several
conceivable utility functions in wealth which would provide the above
expectation. One example is the quadratic utility function. However,
our results do not depend on a quadratic utility of wealth function.
In the usual CAPM world, (that is when there is no estimation risk and
the variance of 8 is zero), if returns are normally distributed then
expected utility is concave in 8 with an interior maximum. For our
-8-
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model, when a = 0, expected utility is assumed to equal F ( y) , a
concave function of y with an interior maximum. Since the distribu-
tion of returns is assumed to be normal, and the distribution of 6 is
now degenerate at y, we have the usual CAPM world. The additional
2
structure that we require is that when a * 0, expected utility can be
written as additively separable in the mean and variance of 8.
Since managers maximize expected utility, they will not agree to a
compensation schedule unless they can be assured the expected utility
to be gained from their next best opportunity. Let Y denote the
representative manager's minimum required expected utility. If the
contract (compensation schedule) is accepted, the manager will choose
a mean and a variance (and thus a portfolio) such that the manager's
expected utility is maximized.
2
In the absence of uncertainty about beta, a - and utility depends
only upon the mean of the degenerate distribution of beta. In this case
the manager would choose a value of b such that:
(6) FM(b)
= 0.
Denote this value by b . Similarly, in the absence of uncertainty about
beta and ignoring the reservation wage of the manager, the investor's
most preferred beta would solve:
(7) F*(b) = 0.
-9-
Denote this value by b
T
.
We define the comparative risk preferences of the manager and the
investor as follows.
Definition
The manager will be said to be less, equally, or more risk, averse
2
as compared to the investor at (u, a ) as
F
M
F
i
—
- is greater than, equal to, or less than —p, respectively.
G G
M I
This definition just states that the more risk averse individual requires
a greater increase in the mean of the beta distribution for an equivalent
increase in the variance.
Definition
The manager will be said to be globally less, globally equally, or
globally more risk averse as compared to the investor if
F 1 F'
M I 2
—
r is greater than, equal to, or less than —- for all (u, a ).
°M G I
The results of the paper depend on the relationship between the
manager's and the investor's risk preferences. In the next section we
show that the relationship between the investor's most preferred values
of b and a (and thus mean and variance) and the manager's choices
depends upon the relative risk preferences of the manager and the
investor.
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III. Results
The relationship between the risk preferences of the manager and of
the Investor has an impact on the choices that these Individuals would
2
make in the absence of uncertainty. In particular, when a = 0, the
less risk averse individual chooses a higher value for b, i.e., chooses
a less risky portfolio. It is straightforward to demonstrate that if
the manager is globally less, equally or more risk averse than the
investor, then b.. is greater than, equal to or less than bT respectively.M 1
This relationship is consistent with the usual definition of risk
aversion in a CAPM world.
We now move on to an examination of the manager's problem. We
assume that the manager's expected utility is separable In wealth and
effort where g(a) is the manager's disutility of effort; g' > and
g" > 0> Given the assumptions of our model the manager will choose a
return-risk-effort combination by choosing b and a so as to solve:
h2
(7) MAX F
M
(b) - G
M(|-) - g(a).b,a
The first order conditions for the manager's problem are then:
(8) f>)-<(f-)-^-0. and
2 2
Ma l
a
Since the manager's utility function is concave in b and a, conditions
(8) and (9) are both necessary and sufficient. Let (b*,a*) denote the
solution to the manager's problem. We have implicitly assumed that the
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raanager's expected utility is strictly greater than Y, the manager's
reservation wage. If the manager's expected utility at (b*,a*) was
just equal to Y, any moral hazard problems would be trivially eliminated.
Our first Proposition states that without estimation risk the
manager would prefer a higher beta portfolio; that is, the mean of the
distribution of beta chosen by the manager will be strictly less than
the manager's most preferred beta in the absence of estimation risk.
Proposition 1: b* < b when a* > 0, and variance is positive.C
JJ
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Estimation
risk provides another source of risk for the manager's chosen portfolio.
Since the manager's risk tolerance takes both estimation risk and
systematic risk into consideration, if one is eliminated, the manager is
willing to assume more of the other. Thus, if estimation risk does not
exist, then the manager will take on more systematic risk. Note that
this proposition is not exclusive to the manager, it also holds for the
investor. Thus, ceteris paribus
, both parties will want a risker port-
folio if there is no estimation risk.
We next consider the potential moral hazard problem between the
investor and the manager. It can be eliminated if a first-best contract
for the investor exists. This will be the case if the solution (b*,a*)
to the manager's problem is also a solution to:
h2
(10) MAX F
x
(b) - G
I
(|-)
b,a
h
2
••*• FM
(b
> - Vr " g(a) -^ Y *
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We call this the investor's problem and denote its solution by (b,a)
The first order conditions for the investor's problem are:
2 2
'
' b 2b ' ' b 2b
(11) Ffb) - G
T
(—). -^ + X[FM (b) - Gf-5-). H] = 0,I laa M Maa
2 2 2 2
(12) g[(—). \+ ^ Gm (—>• \" *'<*>] = 0.
a a
h 2
(13) X[F
M
(b) - G
M (^-)
- g(a) - Y] = 0.
Again, by concavity, these conditions are both necessary and suf-
ficient. Since the objective function is strictly increasing in a, we
know that the constraint will be binding and therefore that X > 0. We
can then rewrite (13) as:
h2
(14) FM (b) - G(—) - g(a) - Y = 0.M Ma
Our second proposition states that given our assumptions there is
no contract that eliminates the moral hazard problem inherent in the
manager's portfolio selection process. Thus, there is no way to
compensate the manager to ensure that he or she makes a decision that
is optimal from the investor's perspective.
Proposition 2 : No first-best optimal contract exists.
We demonstrate this Proposition (in the Appendix) by showing that
for all F , G , F and G satisfying our initial assumptions, (b*,a*) *
I L M M
(b,a).
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Turning our attention to the impact of existing compensation
contracts on the choices made by the manager, we note that a primary
concern is the severity of the moral hazard problem inherent in these
contracts. One factor which affects the problem is the relationship
between the risk, tolerance of the manager and that of the investor. We
now consider what types of investor-manager combinations mitigate the
problem.
If the manager is at least as risk averse as the investor, then a
common moral hazard problem occurs in which the manager provides less
effort and chooses a less risky portfolio than the investor prefers.
The intuition is clear: the manager chooses less effort (smaller a)
because the manager must pay for it and the investor need not. This
leads the manager to trade off to a lower mean of the beta distribution
as well, since that is the only other way to reduce variance.
On the other hand, if the manager is less risk averse than the
investor, then conditions may exist under which the manager is willing
to expend more effort than the investor prefers. In fact, we show that
a necessary condition for the manager to provide more than the investor's
preferred effort is that the manager is globally less risk averse than
the investor.
Theorem
(1) If the manager is globally more or globally equally risk averse
than the investor, then b* < b and a* < a.
(2) If a
_< a* , then b <^ b* and the manager is globally less risk averse
than the investor.
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The most interesting result can be obtained as a Corollary to the
Theorem when we place more structure on the manager and investor
utility functions.
We assume that:
2 2 2
(15) F
]
.(u) - G
]
.(a ) = an u + a^u + a^a + c^
where a < and a > 0.
C16) FM(w)
" G
n
(a
2
) = o^^
2
+ <^2
u + c^^ + c^
where a,. < and ol,~ > 0.
"Ml ^
U
^2
The F and G functions will have such a form if the expected utility
with respect to market uncertainty (systematic risk) is a quadratic
function of beta.
When the expected utility has the above representation, the dif-
ference in risk preferences between the manager and investor can be
characterized completely by b and b . That is, the manager is
globablly less risk averse than the investor if and only if b > b ;
globally equally as risk averse if and only if b = b . Under this
additional structure, we have the following Corollary:
-15-
Corollary
(1) If bM < b T , then b* < b and a* < a.
(2) For each bM , there exist bT and bT , where b T < b T < b.., such that
(a) For be(b\,bw ), b* < b and a* < a;
I I M
(b) For b
I
e(b
I
,b
]
.], b* '> b and a* < a; and
(c) For b e(-»,b ], b* > b and a* > a.
In no case does the manager make the choice combination that the
investor would prefer. The manager either chooses less effort and less
risk than the investor would like, less effort and more risk, or more
effort and more risk. The last result is a natural consequence of the
assumption that as the beta of a portfolio increases, the estimation
risk increases. Thus, the manager must expend more effort to get the
same variance around the chosen mean as he or she would have to for a
smaller beta. Since the investor desires a smaller beta, he or she
will also be satisfied with less effort put into reducing the estimation
risk surrounding that beta. Note that in this last case the managerial
divergent behavior is not in the choosing of too much effort, but in
the choosing of too much risk. Although the investor would be satisfied
with less effort, he or she is not averse to the manager putting in
more effort than would be required.
What implications do this Theorem and Corollary have for the
investor in choosing a portfolio manager? Since the contracts in
current use do not seem to protect the investor against managerial
divergent behavior (considering the compensation schedule only), the
-16-
investor may consider alternative strategies to mitigate this problem.
For example, the investor could choose a manager with greater risk,
tolerance and then invest a portion of his or her funds into a risk free
(unmanaged) portfolio in order to hedge the higher risk the manager has
presumably undertaken. In this situation, the investor needs to know
the risk preferences of the various portfolio managers in order to
choose one with higher risk tolerance. With mutual fund managers such
knowledge is possible due to the advertising of the portfolio's invest-
ment objective. This objective has been found to be a good indicator
of the risk of mutual fund portfolios.
Given our assumptions of linear contracts and quadratic expected
utility functions, we can make more definitive statements concerning
the investor's preference over managers. For expository purposes, take
one of the simplest forms of linear contracts (and the most commonly
used form), s«x, where the manager receives a percentage of the final
market value of the portfolio assets. For any fraction s, suppose the
investor could search over different managers and choose one with the
desired bw . Thus, the investor could choose the manager whose bw isM M
"best" from the investor's perspective; let this "best" bw be denotedM
by b . Since this action is equivalent to choosing b (with b fixed)
so as to maximize the investor's expected utility (under the constraint
that the manager maximizes his or her own expected utility), we can
make a statement concerning the investor's choice of manager.
-17-
Proposition 3 : The investor will choose a manager such that b > b .
If the investor had the ability to choose any manager for a given
contract s, the investor would choose a manager who is globally less
risk, averse than the investor. Since this holds for every contract s,
it must also hold for the second-best optimal contract. That is, since
the choice of the second-best contract is just the choice of s, and
thus implicitly bM and b. , we can make a statement about such a contract,
Proposition 4 : The investor prefers a manager and compensation contract
combination in which the manager is globally less risk averse than the
investor.
The intutition behind this result is that if the manager is enough
less risk averse than the investor, the manager may be willing to supply
extra effort in order to make a "more risky" portfolio acceptable to the
1 f\
investor. This result is consistent with Ross' [1979] partial
equilibrium analysis of the market for agents in which he shows that
less risk averse agents can outbid more risk averse agents in contract-
ing with any risk averse principal.
One aspect of this final result that should be noted is that the
difference between the investor's and the manager's preferences over
beta depends in part upon the manager's aversion to effort, which is
captured in the g(») function. If the manager is sufficiently less
risk averse than the investor, the manager will provide more than the
investor's first best level of effort, and choose a portfolio with more
systematic risk than the investor's first best choice.
-13-
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown the impact of estimation risk on the
portfolio manager-investor problem when the investor does not have
complete information concerning the manager's actions. In our model
under the assumptions of the (1) Capital Asset Pricing Model, and (2)
estimation risk, concerning beta, portfolio managers are able to choose
the parameters of the beta distribution. Given this model the managers
are shown to choose portfolios with less systematic risk than they would
if no estimation risk existed. We also show that no linear contract in
our world can be first best. That is, the manager will not choose the
same amount of effort or risk as the investor would prefer. Since the
investor cannot observe the manager's actions, a moral hazard problem
exists.
Previous literature in agency theory has generally proved that when
a moral hazard problem exists, the agent provides less effort than the
principal would prefer. However, our results show that the direction
of the moral hazard problem depends on the relationship between the
risk tolerance of the manager and that of the investor. That is, there
exist some situations in which the manager may provide more effort than
the investor would prefer. However, the manager also chooses a riskier
portfolio than the investor would prefer. We show that given the most
common compensation contract in use today, the investor prefers a
manager whose risk choice is higher than the investor's own. Thus, the
relationship between these risk tolerances must be an important factor
in the selection of a portfolio manager. By taking this relationship
into consideration, the investor may be able to mitigate the inherent
moral hazard problem.
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Although our results are developed under specific assumptions
regarding the manager's and investor's utility functions, these
assumptions are not as restrictive as they may at first appear. The
important assumption is that expected utility is concave in beta.
There are a number of reasonable utility functions that are consistent
with this assumption. Thus, we believe our results are quite
generalizable.
-20-
Footnotes
For example, see Wall Street Journal , November 15, 1985, p. 7,
"SEC to Let Investment Advisers Collect Performance Fees From Certain
Clients" and Wall Street Journal , January 9, 1986, p. 1, "Business
Bulletin."
2
For example, agency theory has been used to study the insurance
relationship (see Zeckhauser [1970], Spence and Zeckhauser [1971], and
Shavell [1979]); the employer-employee relationship (see Stiglitz
[1974, 1975] and Harris and Raviv [1978]); and the management -owner
relationship (see Jensen and Meckling [1976]).
3
For example, if utility is quadratic in wealth or returns are
normally distributed, and contracts are linear in returns, then
expected utility will have the stated properties.
4
Given these conditions we are assuming that the relationship
between the investor and the manager is static rather than dynamic. The
major rationale for this assumption is the tractability it supplies.
In our model we ignore the ability of the investor or the manager
to reduce risk through diversification. The investor is assumed to
employ only one manager and the manager is assumed to work for only one
investor.
Although investors believe that assets are priced according to
CAPM, it is not assumed that CAPM holds absolutely. There must be some
type of market imperfection in order for the posited fiduciary relation-
ship to exist. Otherwise, there would be no need for the portfolio
manager, and the individual investor could select the portfolio him or
herself. Note that our results would not change with a single factor
arbitrage pricing model.
This assumption is not terribly restrictive since Farrar (1962)
and others have found that most mutual funds are well diversified.
Formally, this assumption implies that r = 1 for all portfolios.
o
Problems due to the fact that the true market portfolio may not be
observable are ignored here.
9
This assumption is consistent with the traditional means of
estimating beta through time series analysis. In other words, the
estimation of the portfolio beta becomes more difficult as the average
beta increases. For example, a portfolio with beta close to zero could
be achieved with most of the investment in riskfree assets and a few
risky assets. Only the risky assets need to have beta estimated. As
the desired beta increases, the portfolio must include more risky
assets. Thus, the greater the number of assets whose betas must be
estimated, the more variance there will be in the portfolio beta.
-21-
In addition, as the desired beta increases, the opportunity set
decreases. Consequently, there is less information on which to base
estimates. Again, the variance of the portfolio beta will be higher.
Therefore, as the desired portfolio beta increases, the manager must
provide more and more effort to maintain the same variance of the
estimate.
See Starks [1987] for a more detailed discussion of the kinds of
contracts that are used between investors and mutual fund managers, as
well as a discussion of the legal restrictions placed on the kinds of
contracts that can be used.
In addition, some portfolio managers (including mutual fund
managers) are restricted by law to linear compensation contracts.
12
As our concern here is not with how a particular contract is
arrived at, bargaining and negotiation between the investor and the
manager is ignored.
13
In the rest of the paper we delete the subscript i referring to
the portfolio. A choice of mean and variance is a choice of portfolio.
14
We employ quadratic expected utility because of its mathematical
simplicity. Since we are assuming normal distributions for market
returns, and since we are interested in the local properties of the
preferences of the manager and the investor, a quadratic expected
utility function provides us with a good local approximation of many
other concave utility functions with interior maximums.
In fact, the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires that mutual
fund managers make this disclosure.
Notice that since the investor knows the manager's preferences,
the investor then has the ability to reduce his or her own risk exposure
by investing more funds in riskfree assets.
However, in Ross' model there is no aversion to effort by the
agent.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Since (1, > for positive variance, we have (from the first order
conditions (9) and (10)) that F (b*) > 0. Using F < 0, we get b* < b .MM M
Proof of Proposition 2
A contract would be first best if there existed a (b,a) pair that
satisfied (8) - (14). Substituting (9) into (12) we have:
2 2
G;<*-) . \ = o.Ia I
a
2 2 2
Since < a < » (from (9)), either G^(|-) = or ^ = 0. If ^- = 0,
a a
then b = 0; the mean and the variance of beta are both zero. There is
no longer any estimation risk; nor is there any systematic risk. In
that case investors do not need managers, since they could just put all
b
2
of their investment in the risk-free asset. If b * 0, then — > 0.
2
a
• b
That gives us G (—) > 0. Therefore, no (b,a) pair exists satisfying
I a
(8) - (14).
Proof of Theorem
We first demonstrate some preliminary results. Let (b.(a),a) solve:
,
b*(a) 2b, (a)
(8«) FM (b.(a))- GM (-i ) * =l a a
and (b_(a), a) solve:
2 2
,
b
? (a) b 9 (a)
(9') G(— )• -~ g'(a) = 0.Ma z
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Clearly, b* = b^a*) = b
2
(a*).
It is straightforward to verify that
db, db 9 db,(a*) db ? (a*)
-r-- > 0, -r^- > 0, -^ -. < 0,da da da da
lim b (a) = lim b (a) =
a+0 a+0
lim b^a) = b
M ,
a *<*>
and verification is left to the reader.
This give us
:
b^a) > b (a) iff a < a* and
b^a) < b
2
(a) iff a > a*.
The investor's first order conditions (where "hats" indicate functions
evaluated at (b,a)) are:
r.«t\ ,£» ^' 2b ,*i * i 2b,(11') F - G . — + X[F - G . —] =
1 i- a M M a
(12-) G-.J+x^.J-g-l-O
(14,) FM- GM _g
- Y '°-
-24-
Combining (IT) and (12') gives:
8 l
I la a2 IM IM
The terra on the right-hand-side in brackets is greater than zero, equal
to zero, or less than zero as the manager is globally more, globally
equally, or globally less risk, averse as compared to the investor,
respectively.
Since G > and X > 0, we have that
. K2V j* - «' < °-
This gives us the result that
b < b
2
(a)
By assumption of the Theorem:
F G - G F > 0.
I M I M -
Using g' > 0, we get:
Combining this with (IT) and A > 0, yields
p' . g' 2b < 0.
M M a _
Therefore,
b > b (a)
-25-
Corabinlng b < b9 (a) and b > b (a), and using the established properties
of b, ( •) and b„(»), we have our desired result:
a > a*.
Thi s also gives b > b*, since both b,( # ) and b ( •) are increasing in a.
(2) If a.< a*, and b? is increasing in a, we get b < b~(a) _< b9 (a*),
or b < b*. The rest is just the contraposition of part I.
Proof of the Corollary
(1) Immediate from the Theorem.
(2) Using the newly defined F and G functions, we can rewrite the
investor's first order conditions as:
(11") -2b(l +t) + 2b T + y[-2b(l +-7) + 2bJ =
-1 -2
(12") ^+ y[^- "g"* (a)] =
3, 3.
-2
(14")
-(b2 + ^-) + 2b
M
b +\3 ~ 1(a) -7=0
_ cr — °-\J[2> — Y
where g = —a—•, a = and Y =
^3
°M1
MJ
""Ml _aMl
Combining (U") and (12") we get
b
2
(b
x
- b
M )
= g*(a). a2 [-b(l +
-7) + bj
-26-
We wish to fix t>M (and thus b* and a*) and see what happens to b and a
as we change the investor's risk, parameter b
T
. Totally differentiating
(11"), (12") and (14"), and using Cramers' rule to solve, we get
.
-2(-?2 - g*(a))(-2b(l + 4) + 2b
x
)
da a a
db
x
=
[H|
b — * 2
.
2(\-g'(a)) Z
db a
dbj [Hi
where H is the Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives. Since
|h| > from concavity, we have
$L-> o.
db
i
da 1
However, the sign of —— depends on the sign of -2b(l + —) + 2b_ , which
db a I
in turn depends on the difference b, - b . Using our combined first
order conditions and conditions (11") and (12"), we can easily show
that if
(a) b
T > bM , then ~- < 0.1 M db
(b) b T = bM , then 4r- " 0.i M db
(c) b_ < bM , then 4r- > 0.i M db
When b = 0, the investor wants only risk free assets and does not need
the manager. Therefore,
lira b(b ) - 0, lira a(b ) = 0.
b +0
l
b +0
l
-27-
We thus know that a(») is a continuous function of b_ that reaches a
a maximum at b = b . We have alread demonstrated that when b < b ,
I M I M
a(b ) > a* > 0. Therefore, there exists b < b such that
a(b
x
) = a*
by the intermediate value theorem, and
a(b ) < a* for all b < b .
If a < a*, then b < b*, which gives us (2)(c) of the Corollary.
Again using the continuity of b(«), we know that there exists b , where
bT < bT < bu , such that1 I M.
b(b) - b*.
Additionally, bCbj) < b*, aCbj.) > a* for all b such that b < "b < b
< h^. This gives us (2)(b) of the Corollary. Using the continuity of
b( •) and a( •) again, we know that
bCbj.) > b* and a(b
r
) > a*
for all bT such that "bT < bT < b . This is (2) (a) of the Corollary.
I I I M
Proof of Propostlon 4
Recall that the manager chooses b and a by solving the first order
conditions:
-2b( 1 + -) + 2bM =a M
b
2
a
- g*(a) = 0.
-28-
The investor chooses b (a manager) by solving the constrained
maximization problem:
MAX - b
2
(l + -) + 2b -b + aTO
, a I 13
b
M
,a,b
s.t. -2b(l + —) + 2b =0
a M
h2
a
Using the first contstraint to solve for b in terms of b and a, and
M
substituting into the second constraint and the objective function, we
can rewrite the investor's problem as:
2 2
may
b
M a (1+a)
. ,. V , -
^'T^a?'" +2bI(^) + ^
b
M
2
s.t. — -r - g'(a) = 0.
(l+a) Z
The Lagrangian for this problem is then:
L(b
M
,a,X) = FIT tV 2b i " V + x["^2- g ' Ca)1
The first order conditions for the investor's problem are then:
M 2 b
3b
M
(l+a) I M (1+a) 2
4~ -
1
~2 t bM (2b T " bM )] + X[ " —^ ~ g" (a)1 = °33 (l+a) 2 l (l+a) 3
b
2
3L M
,,
. _
=
- g'(a) =
3X (l+a) 2
-29-
Let (b,,a) denote the solution to the rewritten problem. If X < 0, then
M —
b - b > and 2b T - b < 0, or b. > b > 2b , which is a contradiction.
I M — I M — I — M — I
Therefore, X > and
b
M
>b
I
our desired result.
Proof of Proposition 5
Immediate from Proposition 4 and the definition of a second-best
optimal contract.
-30-
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